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This release is dated 15 March 2017. The latest version of the document can be found at
https://trustedci.github.io/OSCRP/OSCRP.html. For more information about the group, please
see https://trustedci.github.io/OSCRP/.
This OSCRP is a product of the OSCRP working group. The OSCRP working group is led by
Sean Peisert and Michael Dopheide from ESnet and Von Welch, Andrew Adams, and Susan
Sons from the NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. Core members of the working group
are: RuthAnne Bevier (Caltech), Rich LeDuc (Northwestern), Pascal Meunier (Purdue HUBzero),
Stephen Schwab (USC Information Sciences Institute) and Karen Stocks (Scripps Institution of
Oceanography). Contributing members are Ilkay Altintas (San Diego Supercomputer Center),
James Cuﬀ (Harvard), Reagan Moore (iRods), Warren Raquel (NCSA).
2. Overview and Goals
While Open Science, with its culture of public data, does not have the same cybersecurity
concerns as many other sectors such as ﬁnance and medicine, it is not free from threats. The
Open Science Cyber Risk Proﬁle (OSCRP) is designed to help Principal Investigators (PI) and
their supporting Information Technology (IT) professionals assess cybersecurity risks related to
Open Science projects. Speciﬁcally, it provides a catalog of typical Open Science Assets and
the risks associated with those Assets. For those utilizing the CTSC Cybersecurity Program
Guide, it should expedite the process of inventorying Assets and provide guidance in
completing a Risk Assessment Table.
This document achieves these goals by providing a list of information Assets common to Open
Science projects, which are meaningful to the science mission of those projects, and for each
provides plausible Avenues of Attack for those Assets, with a list of Concerns and
Consequences.
Avenues of Attack are means by which an Asset can be impacted.
Assets can include computing systems, data storage systems, networking, digital sensors,
scientiﬁc and other advanced instruments, scientiﬁc data, personnel, and an interoperable suite
of software services and tools, including data repositories, visualization environments, and
analytic environments. Assets also include the computer-controlled, network-connected
elements of physical plants responsible for the safety and security of these systems, such as
power and HVAC.
A Concern is a potential negative change to an Asset that impacts the mission of the project. A
Concern does not consider the source of the change. For example, the severing of a
transatlantic networking link by whatever means would be a negative change that could
hamper a project’s mission to deliver data to its community and hence for that community to
conduct science. A Concern can also be thought of as a risk but without a measure of
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likelihood. However, in this document, we do not attempt to address likelihood. Therefore, we
use the terms “risk” and “Concern” interchangeably; threat is another synonym.
A Consequence is the negative eﬀect of a realized Concern on the project mission. It is a
synonym for Impact.
The document describes how to use this list of common Assets to understand a project’s
Concerns, assess them, and begin the process of mitigating them.
Other goals of the document include:
Allowing projects to understand the risks associated with their science data so those risks
can be addressed in Data Management Plans
Allowing NSF projects to address the relevant portion of their responsibilities in the NSF
Cooperative Agreement Terms & Conditions for Large Facilities and Large Facilities Manual
3. Who This Document is Intended For
The primary audience of this document is principal investigators (PIs) and information
technology (IT) professionals involved in Open Science projects that rely on computing
infrastructure (deﬁned broadly as computers, networking, sensors, control systems, etc.) Open
Science is deﬁned here as a project working on science that is not classiﬁed and for which the
results are intended to be communicated publicly. This includes most science funded by NSF,
DOE ASCR, and NIH, and may also include some research funded by industry and/or
foundations. Open Science may have some data that is not public (e.g., personal health
information) or transitorily private for periods of time (e.g., during scientiﬁc embargoes, quality
assurance, or internal review).
Not every scientiﬁc research project has a dedicated or even designated “information
technology professional” involved. However, we make the assumption that even such projects
typically have a de facto IT person. That person may be at the “institutional level” and therefore
be almost entirely disconnected from the scientiﬁc project, and perhaps even completely
unaware of it. In those cases, one of the purposes for this document is to enable PIs to help
engage with institutional IT professionals to discuss risks.
A secondary audience for this document is institutional IT professionals (e.g., CIOs, CISOs).
While we do not anticipate that institutional IT professionals will necessarily use this document
directly, we expect that it may be a useful reference for institutional IT professionals to provide
to PIs and research IT professionals within their organization.
We do make the assumption that the institution where Open Science takes place has some
kind of security professional at some level, in addition to a deﬁned or de facto IT person,
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regardless of whether that person is directly attached to the science project or is at the
institutional level.
If you utilize this document and ﬁnd it useful, your acknowledgement of that (and other
feedback) is requested by sending an email to info@trustedci.org.
4. Introduction
We read stories daily about computer security incidents. Home Depot. Sony. The U.S. Oﬃce of
Personnel Management. Hospitals getting hit by ransomware. All of those organizations take
security seriously, but are still vulnerable.
Believe it or not, science — even unclassiﬁed, Open Science is vulnerable as well. And indeed,
Open Science can at times be particularly vulnerable because Open Science is often so
exposed, since by nature there tends to be signiﬁcant sharing of data, resources, and/or
results.
Sometimes, that science is speciﬁcally targeted by attackers whose goal is disruption, possibly
for political reasons or even simple mischief-making.
At other times, attackers — perhaps even scientiﬁc competitors — may be interested in seeing
data before it is publicly released. Attackers might even be interested in tainting the results of
experiments. Finally, computing systems related to science projects can suﬀer a disruptive
security incident without being speciﬁcally targeted by an attacker at all, simply by being
present on a network, and exploitable.
We assert that something on the order of 80% of “good computer security” results from basic
“computer hygiene,” such as having multiple backups including some oﬀ-site, keeping systems
“patched” and up to date, and limiting access controls as much as possible. This document
does not cover basic computer hygiene or system administration. This document is intended to
cover the other 20% that basic hygiene and administration do not cover well.
5. Bad Things Can Happen to Good Science
There are numerous examples of Open Science projects being aﬀected by attacks over
computer networks. Some of these attacks have speciﬁcally targeted the science projects,
while in other examples, science projects have simply been collateral damage. Several real
examples, with identifying details removed, are described below. They show that the damage
can range from simple disruption and some loss of work time to signiﬁcant ﬁnancial resources
spent to repair systems and recover scientiﬁc data, signiﬁcant impact on those projects being
able to fulﬁll their mission.
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Concerns of malicious tampering have historically been organized into three categories:
Integrity (e.g. trust), Availability (e.g. accessibility), and Conﬁdentiality (e.g. privacy.) With
respect to Integrity, it is critical that scientiﬁc outputs be trusted as uncorrupted if they are to
be used as the foundation for future science and critical policy decisions. The loss of
Availability of valuable data or instruments can slow the scientiﬁc process, lead to lost science
opportunities (e.g., if data are permanently lost, or a sensor is down during a particular natural
phenomenon), be expensive to replace, and lead to embarrassment and a loss of reputation.
And ﬁnally, even open science projects generally have Conﬁdentiality concerns with respect to
embargoed data, such as data that have not been quality assessed or will be released after
publication, and restricted data, such as personally identiﬁable information that Federal
regulations prohibit exposing.
Examples of Computer Security Incidents Aﬀecting Research
Untargeted, but disruptive
5-1. A vulnerability in the wiki software used by a microelectronics research lab was leveraged
by attackers to host pornographic web pages on the wiki, and to send out a large volume of
explicit pornographic email messages. The wiki was taken down by its administrators multiple
times in an eﬀort to ﬁnd and remove the underlying exploit left in place by the attackers, which
allowed them to continue abusing the site even after initial discovery. The downtime of this wiki,
which was heavily used by the lab members and their many external collaborators, had a
signiﬁcant impact on research productivity. 
Asset: Documentation (wiki) 
Concern: Inaccessible 
Consequence: Lost science time (research)
5-2. A physics lab and a materials science lab were aﬀected by intrusions into the computers
used to control sensitive lab equipment. The intruders gained access via Windows Remote
Desktop, which was used heavily by lab members to remotely access these instruments. The
intruders used these computers to hide their true location while engaging in social engineering
fraud on dating websites. As part of an eﬀort to avoid discovery, intruders deleted all data,
including scientiﬁc data ﬁles, from one of the instrument controller computers. Research
operations were disrupted and delayed while the computers were examined, rebuilt and
hardened against future intrusions. 
Asset: Network-connected scientiﬁc control systems (instruments) 
Concern: Data loss 
Consequences: Lost science time and reduced reputation
5-3. A system intended to control a networked sensor array was in the process of being set up
when its default login credentials were successfully guessed by a remote attacker. The intruder
installed multiple tools on the compromised system, including a utility that would allow control
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over the hacked system to be retained even after the account used for the initial intrusion was
disabled. Using this utility, the intruder issued a remote command to the compromised
controller system that invoked a second tool, a “ﬂooder” intended for use in a network-based
denial-of-service attack against an oﬀ-site target. Once activated, the ﬂooder generated a
tremendous volume of outbound attack traﬃc, saturating its own network and rendering the
local site’s own border link unusable. Only after the site’s network external network connectivity
was lost was the compromised server and its running ﬂooder tool discovered.
Asset: Network-connected sensor control system; Network infrastructure 
Concern: Inaccessible network 
Consequences: Lost science time, aﬀecting unrelated projects at the same facility, reduced
reputation
5-4. A lab member received an email message stating that a bill is overdue and referencing an
attached invoice. The attachment included an embedded malicious Word macro, which
downloads and installs a program that encrypts commonly-used data ﬁles located on all
mounted drives (“ransomware”). The computer on which the lab member opened the
attachment was a personal laptop on a home network. The lab member closed the laptop while
the ransomware was still executing, not realizing anything was wrong. At work, the lab member
opened up the laptop and mounted the lab’s research ﬁle share as usual. All lab members had
read/write permissions to this volume, so the ransomware, executing under the lab member’s
permissions, encrypted all data ﬁles present on the research ﬁle share. Rather than attempt to
pay the amount in Bitcoin demanded by the ransom letter left on the ﬁle share by the malicious
software, the lab elected to restore the volume from backup, and live with the loss of any data
ﬁles created between time of encryption and the most recent backup.
Asset: Network-attached storage device; lab member’s personal computer 
Concern: Inaccessible or lost research data 
Consequences: Lost science time
Possibly targeted
5-5. A group of hackers gained access to a vulnerable scientiﬁc computing cluster at University
A and quickly determined that these computers were used by collaborators at other
universities. The intruders used credentials captured on systems at University A to get into
multiple compute clusters in research labs at University B and University C, collecting new
captured credentials along the way and gaining additional access to other university systems.
Compromised systems were down and unusable for several days in waves at the aﬀected
sites, while IT and Information Security personnel investigated the intrusions and rebuilt the
aﬀected systems. Users were aﬀected by the downtime and urgent credential change
requirements – in same cases, more than once while the nature of the intrusions was still being
investigated. Aﬀected systems were re-hacked during this incident as a result of some
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privileged users’ failure to change credentials. Investigation and remediation were complicated
further at University A because the research project these systems served involved a physically
remote location with poor network connectivity. At the time the intrusion was discovered, all
personnel directly familiar with the conﬁguration and management of these systems were at the
remote location, with little in the way of explanatory documentation left for local IT staﬀ to rely
on while attempting to investigate and resolve the incident. Downtime, widespread credential
changes, and general confusion all impacted the research project.
Assets: Servers (compute clusters), staﬀ computing & networking and networks 
Concerns: Devices inaccessible and devices exposing sensitive information and transport
prevented 
Consequences: Lost science time
Targeted
5-6. A politically controversial project (the building of a new large-scale telescope) was
subjected to attack by “hacktivists” who generated large quantities of protest mail to the
mailboxes of the oﬃcers of the project and the project’s informational contact address,
rendering these mailboxes unusable due to the volume of messages. Protesters also engaged
in distributed denial-of-service attacks against the project’s website, repeatedly knocking it
oﬄine. This made communication between the project and its supporters, the media, and
citizenry who wished to learn more about the controversy extremely diﬃcult. 
Assets: Servers (mail) and networks 
Concerns: Devices inaccessible and transport prevented 
Consequences: Lost science time and reduced reputation
5-7. The primary mail server for a university’s climate research group was hacked by protesters,
who then copied oﬀ the mail from this server and made it public shortly before a scheduled
world summit on climate change. Subsequent media reports accused researchers (who said
their words in private email messages were taken out of context) of fraud and conspiracy. In
addition to the immediate impact of the security incident on the mail server and its usability, the
aftermath of the intrusion included multiple separate fraud and misconduct investigations.
Although these investigations failed to substantiate allegations of fraud, public conﬁdence in
climate change research was damaged. 
Asset: Internal data 
Concern: Data exposed 
Consequences: Reduced reputation and legal action
The point we emphasize with these examples is that computer security-related Consequences
in Open Science can be as important as Consequences elsewhere, and researchers should not
assume that simply because data are eventually intended to be published openly that they
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should not care about computer security. Nor should researchers assume that their institutions
will protect them—at least not without active engagement between the PI and the institution.
6. How to Use this Document
The following sections of this document provides a list of common Open Science Assets. Each
Asset is critical to a project’s science mission in some way such that it represents a set of
Concerns. That is, if the Asset is negatively impacted in some manner, it reduces the project’s
ability to carry out its mission.
In this section, we describe how to use this list of common Assets to understand a project’s
Concerns, assess them, and begin the process of mitigating them.
The following are the intended steps for using this document. The expectation is that the ﬁrst
two steps are accomplished by the project PI working in collaboration with the project’s
designated cybersecurity lead. Subsequent steps are accomplished by the project
cybersecurity lead.
Intended Steps to Use this Document
1. Identify the stakeholders of the science project — at the very least, this includes the
principal investigator(s) and science team; other researchers, including possible external
users; the institution that owns or manages the science instrument, the project, and the
mission it supports; and possibly human subjects of the science project.
2. Create an Asset inventory for the project by looking through the list in the “Common Open
Science Assets” section, and identifying all the Assets relevant to the Open Science
project.
3. For each mission critical science Asset, examine the Concerns, Consequences, and
Avenues of Attack diagram associated with the Asset and note which Concerns and
Consequences are relevant to the project, and the extent to which they are relevant
4. For each relevant Concern note the vectors that could cause the Concern to be realized.
5. Work with IT professionals to agree on and implement agreed controls (protections against
Concerns) or other means of mitigating risk.
6. Repeat this assessment annually, or more frequently if the project’s Assets or risks have
changed.
While mitigations are outside the scope of this document, the process of identifying key
Assets and avenues of attack is intended to help guide scientists and IT professionals in
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pursuing risk-justiﬁed controls to mitigate avenues of attack via other sources. Note that
the CTSC can help identify these external sources here, as well.
7. Usage Example: Embargoed Data Case Study
To demonstrate how to carry out the risk proﬁle steps, we’ll pretend we are the PI for a small
science project that has two telescopes tracking changes in the night sky over time. In Step 1
of the process ﬂow, we identify the stakeholders as our immediate project team, a collaborating
research team, and the institutions that house the two telescopes. The stakeholders may be
brought in to help with the remaining steps as well as to discuss the results.
In Step 2 we go through the Asset Catalogue below and select Assets relevant to our project.
As we select our Assets, we include brief descriptions of the precise project Asset we’re
referring to.
We believe the following Assets apply to our project:
Embargoed Data: Due to the funding sources and collaborators involved, it’s important to
the stakeholders that any potential discoveries made by this project have time to be vetted
by appropriate experts and carefully released to the public. Speciﬁcally, the triangulated
location of small and medium-sized near Earth objects should be kept secure for the
private analysis of project scientists.
Staﬀ Computing & Networking: The workstations, laptops, and connectivity of project staﬀ
and any outside collaborators.
Telescopes: Our telescopes have network-connected control system that allows for remote
collaborators to adjust parameters. Both telescopes are considered similar, but separate
Assets due to their placement at diﬀerent institutions.
File-store: The data from the telescope as well as preliminary results are stored on a central
data storage system.
Step 3 begins after the Assets have been identiﬁed. For this example, we select just one of our
Assets — Embargoed Data — and examine its Consequences, Concerns and Avenues of
Attack diagram:
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From this diagram, select the Concerns and Consequences that are most relevant to your
project. It is often helpful to color code your own copy of the diagram to help portray these
decisions and well as their relative importance. By focusing on the Consequences that are
most important to the project, it will automatically lead us to the Avenues of Attacks that we will
want to be most concerned about. This will help prioritize later actions.
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In this sample case, we’ve selected that we are most concerned about lost data (red) with
corrupted data (orange) being a close second. While we prefer our data to be embargoed, it
would not be the end of the world if it happened to get exposed (green). Next we are assuming
for our example that it’s impossible to reproduce new data so the ﬁrst Consequence from the
reference diagram is removed, as well as the possibility of legal action. However, we’ve
decided that data exposure would result in another Consequence so we’ve added a custom
one, “loss of control of result of publication,” in blue.
We see in the diagram that the Avenues of Attack for embargoed data reference other Assets
that are the likely cause of a problem. This may help identify more Assets that we hadn’t
previously considered. Let’s follow one of those paths to see where it leads. On the bottom
right, we see the Servers Assets could lead to exposed data, so we pull up the Servers Asset
diagram:
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Looking at the Servers Asset we are presented with several more Concerns and Avenues of
Attack. As you can see, by starting with our Concerns about data and the possible
Consequences we care about as scientists, we are able to follow the diagrams and end up with
a mapping to possible Avenues of Attack.
For your project, you’ll repeat Step 3 for each identiﬁed Asset. This will make it easier to think
about and discuss (with your stakeholders and IT/cyber security lead) what can be done to
mitigate those Avenues of Attack, focusing on those that address your highest Concerns. In
addition, try to think about what other Avenues of Attack may be possible that are unique to
your environment.
8. Common Open Science Assets
In this section we list common Open Science Assets and provide a diagram for each that
provides a connection between the Concerns and Consequences from the perspective of the
project mission and the Avenues of Attack that provide guidance to the cybersecurity lead in
mitigating the Concerns regarding the Asset.
Data Assets
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Data includes what we traditionally deﬁne as “data”, i.e., raw data, derived data, as well as
algorithms, protocols, conﬁguration, accounting, personal or management data.
Public Data: Published generated or collected Open Science data
Embargoed Data: Open Science data that has not yet been publicly released
Internal data: Data that is never intended to be published. This includes: generated or
derived data (usually intermediate computational results), e-mails or notes
Documentation: Manuals, wikis, blogs, etc. that facilitate the production, post-processing
or management of Assets
Accounting Information: Logs and databases recording the production, post-processing or
management of Assets
For Approved Access Only: Project/personnel data necessary for the Open Science
mission
Facilities Assets
Facilities: Physical storage, power & climate control used to house Assets
Staﬀ computing & networking: Institutional systems used by staﬀ to access Assets, e.g.,
desktops, laptops, smartphones and the infrastructures they leverage (also mailing lists,
calendars)
Note, the risk associated with this Asset is absorbed by the institution that owns them,
not the project, but it is useful for the project to understand the greater risks involved
System and Hardware Assets
Networks: Infrastructure used to access or transport data
File-store: System to archive data
Front-end: System to access archived data, usually web-based
Back-end: System to search data, usually a database or source repository
User Portal: System enabling users to initiate production or post-processing of data
Servers: Systems used to access, store, produce and/or manipulate other Assets
Desktops: Systems used to access, store, produce and/or manipulate other Assets
Laptops: Systems used to access, store, produce and/or manipulate other Assets
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Mobile devices: Systems used to access other Assets (tablets, smartphones,
smartwatches)
Software Assets
3rd Party: External applications, algorithms, models, e.g., computation / analysis, used by
the project
Internal software: Applications, algorithms, or models produced internally, can include:
Restricted software, algorithms, or models (“secret sauce” - competitive/intellectual
property)
Non-restricted software, algorithms, or models developed and used by the
organization
Instruments
Sensors: Sensor instruments (e.g., network-connected neutrino collectors)
Network-connected scientiﬁc control systems (e.g., microscopes, telescopes, light sources,
particle accelerators)
Intangible and Human Assets
Project Reputation: Credibility associated with an organization
Staﬀ: People involved in the production, post-processing or management of Assets
Collaboration: Meetings and agendas used by staﬀ to coordinate the production, post-
processing or management of Assets
Workﬂow: The process or protocols by which science is achieved within a project
Financial: The ﬁnancial assets owned by a project
9. Next Steps
As mentioned earlier, this document focuses on the process of identifying key scientiﬁc Assets
and understanding some of the key risks that those Assets may be vulnerable to. However, this
document does not attempt to address the process of actually mitigating Concerns. This
document aims to enable the PI or information technology lead to go through the process of
assessing computer security related Concerns and Avenues of Attack, in order to help them
3/14/2017 Open Science Cyber Risk Proﬁle
http://trustedci.github.io/OSCRP/OSCRP.html 15/17
have a dialogue with personnel with cybersecurity expertise who can actually assist with
mitigation steps by implementing appropriate protections.
10. Conclusions
Open Science, despite having a culture of public data and open collaboration, still faces
cybersecurity-related threats. This document aids Principal Investigators and their supporting
IT professionals in assessing cybersecurity risks through a catalog of typical Open Science
Assets and the common risks associated with those Assets.
11. Cybersecurity Resources for Open Science
For projects that need assistance, here are some resources to consider:
The NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence: http://trustedci.org/help/
The EDUCAUSE IT Risk Register
HEISC’s Information Security Guide
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Edit or comment on this page on
GitHub
 trustedci Welcome to OSCRP, a joint project of the
NSF Cybersecurity of Excellence and the
14. Contributing to this Document
This document is hosted in GitHub to encourage the community to make contributions of new
Assets and other improvements. One needs a free GitHub account to contribute. Your options
for doing so are:
1. Point out a problem or make a suggestion by creating a issue.
2. Author changes or additions by creating a fork and push your changes. You can use a
number of methods for make changes and pushing them (e.g. cloning the repository and
editing the markdown locally). A simple workﬂow that uses just your browser follows.
1. Once you have a fork, edit a markdown ﬁle (.MD) in the main OSCRP repository by
clicking on it and then selecting edit (“pencil” icon in upper right). E.g
https://github.com/trustedci/OSCRP/edit/master/OSCRP.md
2. Make your changes to the markdown (you may ﬁnd a markdown cheatsheet useful.
3. When you are done, propose your the changes using the form at the bottom of the
page.
1. Enter a one-line description of your changes in the ﬁrst text box.
2. You can enter additional text in the second box. E.g. if your change is in reference
to a GitHub issue, referencing that issue is a good idea.
3. Click on “Propose ﬁle change”
4. You should now see a “Open a Pull Request” window in your browser. It should be
populated with your comments from the previous window and ready to go, though you
can add more comments if you wish.
5. Click on “Create Pull Request”
6. You should now see a “Comparing changes” page showing you the details of the
changes you are proposing. Please review them and make sure they look right. If so,
click “Create Pull Request”. If not, click on your browser’s Back button and continuing
editing.
7. You should now see a “Open a Pull Request” window, which should be populated with
the comments you previously entered. This is your last chance to add any additional
detail you want the OSCRP maintainers and others looking at your request to know.
When you are ready, click on “Create Pull Request”
8. You should now see a page with your submitting pull request. The OSCRP maintainers
will have been notiﬁed and will examine your proposed changes and get back to you.
Open Science Cyber Risk Proﬁle
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